Constructing Courts: Judicial Institutional Change Embedded in Larger Political Dynamics by Engel, Stephen M.
Tulsa Law Review 
Volume 49 
Issue 2 Book Review 
Winter 2013 
Constructing Courts: Judicial Institutional Change Embedded in 
Larger Political Dynamics 
Stephen M. Engel 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Stephen M. Engel, Constructing Courts: Judicial Institutional Change Embedded in Larger Political 
Dynamics, 49 Tulsa L. Rev. 291 (2013). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol49/iss2/6 
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for 





JUDICIAL	  INSTITUTIONAL	  CHANGE	  EMBEDDED	  	  
IN	  LARGER	  POLITICAL	  DYNAMICS,	  
OR	  THE	  IMPORTANCE	  OF	  	  
NO	  LONGER	  CONSIDERING	  THE	  JUDICIARY	  	  
AN	  INSTITUTION	  APART	  
Stephen	  M.	  Engel	  *	  
JUSTIN	   CROWE,	   BUILDING	   THE	   JUDICIARY:	   LAW,	   COURTS,	   AND	   THE	   POLITICS	   OF	  INSTITUTIONAL	  DEVELOPMENT	  (2012).	  Pp.	  312.	  Hardcover	  $35.00.	  	   JED	   HANDELSMAN	   SHUGERMAN,	   THE	   PEOPLE’S	   COURTS:	   PURSUING	   JUDICIAL	  INDEPENDENCE	  IN	  	  AMERICA	  (2012).	  Pp.	  400.	  Hardcover	  $35.00.	  	  In	  1962,	  legal	  scholar	  Alexander	  Bickel	  published	  The	  Least	  Dangerous	  Branch,	  which	  subsequently	  defined	  the	  boundaries	  of	  scholarship	  on	  the	  federal	  judiciary,	  particularly	   on	   the	   Supreme	   Court,	   for	   decades.1	   Bickel	   viewed	   the	   popular	   and	  elected-­‐branch	  hostilities	   toward	   the	  Warren	  Court,	  which	   characterized	   the	   judi-­‐cial	  politics	  at	   the	   time	  of	  his	  writing,	   as	  a	   consequence	  of	   the	  unelected	  branch’s	  structural	  deviance	  in	  a	  democracy.2	  Indeed,	  The	  Least	  Dangerous	  Branch	  builds	  on	  a	   foundational	   supposition	   defining	   American	   political	   institutions,	   namely	   that	  they	  were	  designed	  so	  that,	  in	  James	  Madison’s	  famous	  words,	  “[a]mbition	  must	  be	  made	   to	   counteract	   ambition.”3	   Following	   the	   logic	   of	   separated	  powers	  meant	   to	  check	   and	   balance	   one	   another,	   a	   counter-­‐majoritarian	   court—an	   institution	  
                                                	   *	   Assistant	  Professor	  of	  Politics,	  Bates	  College;	  Visiting	  Research	  Fellow,	  American	  Bar	  Foundation	  (2013-­‐2014).	  	  	   1.	  	   ALEXANDER	  M.	  BICKEL,	  THE	  LEAST	  DANGEROUS	  BRANCH:	  THE	  SUPREME	  COURT	  AT	  THE	  BAR	  OF	  POLITICS	  (2d	  ed.	  1986).	  	   2.	  	   Id.	   at	   18.	   On	   hostilities	   toward	   the	  Warren	   Court,	   see	   STEPHEN	   M.	   ENGEL,	   AMERICAN	   POLITICIANS	  CONFRONT	  THE	  COURT:	  OPPOSITION	  POLITICS	  AND	  CHANGING	  RESPONSES	  TO	  JUDICIAL	  POWER	  285-­‐323	  (2011)	  and	  WALTER	  F.	  MURPHY,	  CONGRESS	  AND	  THE	  COURT:	  A	  CASE	  STUDY	  IN	  AMERICAN	  POLITICAL	  PROCESS	  (1962).	  The	  in-­‐tensity	   and	  potential	   of	   these	  hostilities	   is	   disputed.	   Charles	  Geyh	   cites	   the	   failure	   of	   court-­‐curbing	   as	  evidence	  that	  a	  norm	  of	  judicial	  supremacy	  had	  fully	  manifested	  in	  Congress,	  while	  Lucas	  Powe	  contends	  that	  the	  many	  Warren-­‐era	  “anti-­‐Court	  measures,	  though	  not	  as	  all-­‐encompassing	  as	  the	  [Franklin	  D.	  Roo-­‐sevelt]	   Court-­‐packing	   plan,	   had	   come	   far	   closer	   to	   passage	   than	   Roosevelt’s	   initiative.”	   CHARLES	   GEYH,	  WHEN	   COURTS	   AND	   CONGRESS	   COLLIDE	   109-­‐10	   (2006);	   see	   also	   LUCAS	   POWE,	   JR.,	   THE	   WARREN	   COURT	   AND	  AMERICAN	  POLITICS	  133	  (2000).	  	   3.	  	   THE	  FEDERALIST	  NO.	  51	  (James	  Madison).	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through	  which	  unelected	  judges	  might	  overturn	  the	  will	  of	  popular	  majorities	  or,	  at	  least,	  the	  will	  of	  politicians	  elected	  by	  popular	  majorities—was	  an	  unsettling	  poten-­‐tial	  from	  the	  start.4	  This	  possibility,	  which	  Bickel	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  Court’s	  “counter-­‐majoritarian	  difficulty,”5	  has	  been	  called	  the	  “dominant	  paradigm	  of	  constitutional	  law	  and	  scholarship”6	  by	  one	  scholar	  and	  “an	  academic	  obsession”7	  by	  another.	  Two	  superbly	  written	  and	   recently	  published	  books,	   Justin	  Crowe’s	  Building	   the	   Judici-­‐
ary:	  Law,	  Courts	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	   Institutional	  Development8	  and	  Jed	  Handelsman	  Shugerman’s	  The	  People’s	  Courts:	  Pursuing	  Judicial	   Independence	   in	  America,9	  chal-­‐lenge	   the	   counter-­‐majoritarian	   framework	   that	   structures	   too	   much	   scholarship	  and	  popular	  understanding	  of	   federal	  and	  state	   judicial	  power.10	  Each	  author	  con-­‐fronts	  and	  undermines	  assumptions	  of	  inter-­‐branch	  conflict	  and	  static	  definitions	  of	  judicial	  independence.	  As	  such,	  they	  pursue	  an	  ongoing	  project	  in	  political	  science,	  particularly	   in	   the	   subfields	   of	   public	   law	   and	  American	  political	   development,	   to	  promote	  a	   fundamental	  paradigm	  shift	   in	  how	  scholars	  of	   law	  and	  politics	   should	  consider	  the	  power	  of	  courts	  and	  judges.	  Ironically,	   the	  paradigm	  shift	   away	   from	  Bickel’s	   elaboration	  of	   the	  counter-­‐majoritarian	   difficulty—which	   was	   hardly	   a	   new	   claim	   when	   Bickel	   wrote	   it11—began	  before	  his	  book	  was	  published.	  While	  Bickel	  penned	  his	  book	  during	  his	  post	  at	   Yale	   Law	   School,	   political	   scientist	   Robert	   Dahl,	   whose	   office	   was	   across	   the	  street	  at	  the	  Yale	  Hall	  of	  Graduate	  Studies,	  had	  already	  published	  a	  brief	  article,	  De-­‐
cision	   Making	   in	   a	   Democracy:	   The	   Supreme	   Court	   as	   National	   Policy-­‐Maker,	   five	  years	  prior.12	  That	  article	  questioned	  some	  of	  the	  claims	  that	  would	  make	  Bickel	  so	  famous.	  Bickel	  had	  sought	  a	  rationale	  for,	  and	  a	  recommendation	  to,	  judges	  that	  might	  curb	   the	  hostile	   rhetoric	   triggered	  by	   some	  of	   the	  more	  controversial	  Warren-­‐era	  rulings.	  He	  settled	  on	  appealing	   to	   judges	   to	  exercise	  restraint	  by	  employing	   their	  “passive	   virtue”	   of	   deciding	  not	   to	  decide.13	  However,	  Dahl	  maintained	   that	  while	  Bickel’s	  worry	  made	  theoretical	  sense,	  such	  counter-­‐majoritarianism	  and	  the	  peri-­‐odic	  “fury”	  it	  promoted,	  was,	  in	  fact,	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  short-­‐lived.14	  Dahl	  conceded	  
                                                	   4.	  	   See	  Brutus,	  The	  Anti-­‐Federalist	  Essays,	  XIII	  (Feb.	  21,	  1778),	  available	  at	  http://www.constitution.org/afp/brutus13.htm;	  Brutus,	  The	  Anti-­‐Federalist	  Essays,	  XVI	  (Apr.	  10,	  1788),	  
available	  at	  http://www.constitution.org/afp/brutus16.htm.	  	   5.	  	   BICKEL,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  16.	  	  	   6.	  	   Erwin	   Chemerinsky,	  The	   Supreme	   Court,	   1988	   Term	   Foreword:	   The	   Vanishing	   Constitution,	   103	  HARV.	  L.	  REV.	  43,	  61	  (1989).	  	   7.	  	   Barry	  Friedman,	  The	  Birth	  of	  an	  Academic	  Obsession:	  The	  History	  of	  the	  Countermajoritarian	  Diffi-­‐
culty,	  Part	  Five,	  112	  YALE	  L.J.	  153,	  159	  (2002).	  	   8.	  	   JUSTIN	  CROWE,	  BUILDING	  THE	  JUDICIARY:	  LAW,	  COURTS,	  AND	  THE	  POLITICS	  OF	  INSTITUTIONAL	  DEVELOPMENT	  (2012).	  	   9.	  	   JED	   HANDELSMAN	   SHUGERMAN,	   THE	   PEOPLE’S	   COURTS:	   PURSUING	   JUDICIAL	   INDEPENDENCE	   IN	   AMERICA	  (2012).	  	   10.	  	   CROWE,	  supra	  note	  8;	  SHUGERMAN,	  supra	  note	  9.	  	  	   11.	  	   See	  Charles	  Beard,	  The	  Supreme	  Court	  –	  Usurper	  or	  Grantee?,	  27	  POL.	  SCI.	  Q.	  (Mar.	  1,	  1912).	  	   12.	  	   Robert	  Dahl,	  Decision	  Making	  in	  a	  Democracy:	  The	  Supreme	  Court	  as	  a	  National	  Policy-­‐Maker,	  6	  J.	  PUB.	  L.	  279	  (1957),	  reprinted	  in	  50	  EMORY	  L.J.	  563	  (2001).	  	   13.	  	   BICKEL,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  111-­‐13.	  	   14.	  	   For	  histories	  of	  public	  and	  congressional	  hostilities	  toward	  the	  Court	  during	  particular	  eras,	  see	  RICHARD	  E.	  ELLIS,	  THE	   JEFFERSONIAN	  CRISIS:	   COURTS	  AND	  POLITICS	   IN	   THE	  YOUNG	  REPUBLIC	   (1971);	   STANLEY	   I.	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that	   judicial	   review,	   or	   the	   power	   of	   unelected	   federal	   judges	   to	   decide	   whether	  state	  or	  federal	  law	  conforms	  to	  the	  requirements	  of	  the	  Constitution,	  had	  undemo-­‐cratic	  implications.15	  Nevertheless,	  the	  counter-­‐majoritarian	  threat	  failed	  to	  materi-­‐alize	  for	  any	  significant	  length	  of	  time	  precisely	  because	  of	  the	  way	  judicial	  nomina-­‐tion	   and	   confirmation	   were	   designed:	   “even	   without	   examining	   actual	   cases,	   it	  would	   appear	   on	  political	   grounds,	   somewhat	   unrealistic	   to	   suppose	   that	   a	   Court	  whose	  members	  are	  recruited	  in	  the	  fashion	  of	  Supreme	  Court	  justices	  would	  long	  hold	  to	  norms	  of	  Right	  or	  Justice	  substantially	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  political	  elite.”16	  Furthermore,	  the	  Court,	  lacking	  power	  to	  implement	  its	  rulings	  without	  the	  support	   of	   the	   other	   branches,	   represents	   little	   threat	   to	   democracy.17	   Therefore,	  judges	  would	  not	   simply	   impose	   their	  own	  policy	  preferences	  dressed	  up	  as	   legal	  interpretation,	  but	  would	  instead	  rule	  strategically	  so	  as	  not	  to	  raise	  the	  ire	  of	  elect-­‐ed	  branches,	  fellow	  judges	  and	  the	  legal	  academy,	  or	  the	  broader	  public.	  What	  has	  come	  to	  be	  known	  as	  Dahl’s	  “regime”	  thesis,	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  three	  federal	   branches	   might	   act	   more	   cooperatively	   to	   achieve	   political	   ends,	   experi-­‐enced	  a	  renaissance	  beginning	  in	  the	  1990s.18	  Dahl’s	  ideas	  spurred	  an	  agenda	  to	  re-­‐search	  whether	  and	  how	  appointment	  and	  other	  aspects	  of	   the	   judiciary’s	   institu-­‐tional	  embedding	  in	  a	  multi-­‐branch	  government	  might	  affect	  its	  rulings.19	  In	  short,	  would	   judges	   simply	   impose	   their	   own	  policy	   preferences	   as	   law?	  Or	  would	   they	  
                                                                                                                    KUTLER,	  JUDICIAL	  POWER	  AND	  RECONSTRUCTION	  POLITICS	  (1968);	  WILLIAM	  LEUCHTENBERG,	  THE	  SUPREME	  COURT	  REBORN:	  THE	  CONSTITUTIONAL	  REVOLUTION	  IN	  THE	  AGE	  OF	  ROOSEVELT	  (1995);	  GERARD	  N.	  MAGLIOCCA,	  ANDREW	  JACKSON	  AND	  THE	  CONSTITUTION:	  THE	  RISE	  AND	  FALL	  OF	  GENERATIONAL	  REGIMES	  (2007);	  MARK	  C.	  MILLER,	  THE	  VIEW	  OF	   THE	  COURTS	   FROM	  THE	  HILL	   (2009);	  WILLIAM	  G.	  ROSS,	  A	  MUTED	  FURY:	  POPULISTS,	   PROGRESSIVES	   AND	  LABOR	  UNIONS	  CONFRONT	  THE	  COURTS,	  1890-­‐1937	  (1993);	  JEFF	  SHESOL,	  SUPREME	  POWER:	  FRANKLIN	  ROOSEVELT	  V.	   THE	   SUPREME	   COURT	   (2010).	   On	   presidential-­‐court	   relations,	   see	   KEITH	   WHITTINGTON,	   POLITICAL	  FOUNDATIONS	  OF	  JUDICIAL	  SUPREMACY:	  THE	  PRESIDENCY,	  THE	  SUPREME	  COURT,	  AND	  CONSTITUTIONAL	  LEADERSHIP	  IN	  U.S.	  HISTORY	  (2007).	  	   15.	  	   See	  generally	  Dahl,	  supra	  note	  12,	  at	  564-­‐65,	  567.	  	  	  	   16.	  	   Id.	  at	  578.	  For	  various	  criticisms	  of	  Dahl’s	  empirics,	  see	  Jonathan	  Casper,	  The	  Supreme	  Court	  and	  
National	  Policy	  Making,	  70	  AM.	  POL.	  SCI.	  REV.	  1,	  50-­‐63	  (1976).	  	   17.	  	   In	  The	  Federalist	  No.	  78,	  Hamilton	  characterizes	  the	  Court	  as	  “the	  least	  dangerous”	  branch	  since	  it	  lacks	  the	  executive’s	  power	  of	   the	  sword	  and	  the	   legislature’s	  power	  of	   the	  purse.	   It	  has	  “merely	   judg-­‐ment.”	  See	  THE	  FEDERALIST	  NO.	  78	  (Alexander	  Hamilton)	  (June	  14,	  1788).	  Gerald	  Rosenberg	  expands	  this	  “constrained	   Court”	   thesis.	   See	   GERALD	   ROSENBERG,	   THE	   HOLLOW	   HOPE:	   CAN	   COURTS	   BRING	   ABOUT	   SOCIAL	  CHANGE?	  (3d	  ed.	  2008).	  	   18.	  	   See	  Matthew	  E.	  K.	  Hall,	  Rethinking	  Regime	  Politics,	  37	  L.	  &	  SOC.	  INQUIRY	  878	  (2012)	  (critiquing	  re-­‐gime	  thesis	  literature).	  	   19.	  	   On	  strategic	  approaches	  to	  judicial	  decision-­‐making,	  see	  FORREST	  MATZMAN	  ET	  AL.,	  CRAFTING	  LAW	  ON	  THE	  SUPREME	  COURT:	  THE	  COLLEGIAL	  GAME	  (2000);	  Jeffrey	  A.	  Segal,	  What’s	  Law	  Got	  to	  Do	  with	  It:	  Thoughts	  
from	  “The	  Realm	  of	  Political	  Science,”	  in	  WHAT’S	  LAW	  GOT	  TO	  DO	  WITH	  IT?	  WHAT	  JUDGES	  DO,	  WHY	  THEY	  DO	  IT,	  AND	  WHAT’S	  AT	  STAKE	  17	  (Charles	  G.	  Geyh	  ed.,	  2011);	  Tom	  S.	  Clark,	  The	  Separation	  of	  Powers,	  Court	  Curb-­‐
ing,	  and	  Judicial	  Legitimacy,	  53	  AM.	  J.	  POL.	  SCI.	  971	  (2009);	  Lee	  Epstein	  et	  al.,	  The	  Supreme	  Court	  as	  a	  Stra-­‐
tegic	   National	   Policy	  Maker,	   50	   EMORY	   L.J.	  583	   (2001);	   John	   Ferejohn	  &	   Barry	  Weingast,	  Limitation	   of	  
Statutes:	  Strategic	  Statutory	  Interpretation,	  80	  GEO.	  L.J.	  565	  (1992);	  McNollgast,	  Politics	  and	  the	  Courts:	  A	  
Positive	  Theory	  of	  Judicial	  Doctrine	  and	  the	  Rule	  of	  Law,	  68	  S.	  CAL.	  L.	  REV.	  1631	  (1994-­‐95);	  Jeffrey	  A.	  Segal,	  
Separation-­‐of-­‐Powers	  Games	  in	  the	  Positive	  Theory	  of	  Congress	  and	  Courts,	  91	  AM.	  POL.	  SCI.	  REV.	  1,	  28-­‐44	  (1997).	  For	  a	  discussion	  on	  historical	  institutionalist	  accounts	  that	  focus	  on	  the	  constraints	  that	  compel	  judicial	  decision-­‐making,	  see	  THOMAS	  M.	  KECK,	  THE	  MOST	  ACTIVIST	  SUPREME	  COURT	  IN	  HISTORY:	  THE	  ROAD	  TO	  MODERN	   JUDICIAL	   CONSERVATISM	   (2004);	  MICHAEL	   KLARMAN,	   FROM	   JIM	   CROW	   TO	   CIVIL	   RIGHTS:	   THE	   SUPREME	  COURT	  AND	  THE	  STRUGGLE	  FOR	  RACIAL	  EQUALITY	  (2004);	  KEVIN	  MCMAHON,	  RECONSIDERING	  ROOSEVELT	  ON	  RACE:	  HOW	  THE	  PRESIDENCY	  PAVED	  THE	  ROAD	  TO	  BROWN	  (2004);	  POWE,	  supra	  note	  2;	  Cornell	  Clayton	  &	  J.	  Mitchell	  Pickerill,	  The	  Politics	  of	  Criminal	  Justice:	  How	  the	  New	  Right	  Regime	  Shaped	  the	  Rehnquist	  Court’s	  Criminal	  
Justice	  Jurisprudence,	  94	  GEO.	  L.J.	  1385	  (2006).	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temper	  their	  aims,	  ruling	  strategically	  not	  only	  to	  appeal	  to	  fellow-­‐judges	  on	  a	  mul-­‐ti-­‐judge	  panel,	  but	  also	   to	  avoid	  backlash	   from	   the	  elected	  branches?	  But,	   as	  both	  Crowe	  and	  Shugerman	  point	  out,	  how	  judges	  decide	  need	  not	  be	  the	  central	  ques-­‐tion	  animating	  public	  law	  and	  judicial	  research,	  particularly	  for	  scholars	  interested	  in	  evaluating	  how	  elected	  branches	  interact	  with	  the	  Court	  or	  even	  how	  the	  Court’s	  power	  has	  changed	  over	  time.20	  Crowe’s	  focus	  “is	  less	  on	  what	  the	  judiciary	  does	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  other	  political	  insti-­‐tutions	  than	  on	  what	  is	  done	  to	  the	  judiciary	  both	  by	  external	  actors	  and	  by	  its	  own	  members.”21	  Therefore,	  he	   is	   less	   concerned	  with	  examining	   rulings	  and	  doctrine,	  or	  with	  assessing	  their	  political	  or	  historical	   force	  as	  some	  constitutional	  develop-­‐ment	  literature	  has	  done.22	  Rather,	  Crowe	  seeks	  to	  examine	  what	  he	  calls	  the	  “ana-­‐lytically	  antecedent	  matter	  of	  how	   [the	   federal	   judiciary]	  became	  structurally	  and	  institutionally	  equipped	  to	  exert	  power	  and	  authority	  across	  a	  range	  of	  areas.”23	  In	  other	  words,	  he	  aims	  to	  describe	  and	  evaluate	  the	  processes	  through	  which	  federal	  judicial	  power	  as	  an	  institutional	  matter	  was	  deliberately	  constructed.	  Shugerman	  is	  interested	  in	  explaining	  change	  in	  judicial	  selection	  at	  the	  state	  level.	   For	  example,	  he	   is	   interested	   in	  why	   the	  process	   in	  many	  states	  has	   shifted	  from	   gubernatorial	   or	   legislative-­‐appointed	   systems	   to	   popularly	   elected	   systems	  or	   to	   “merit”	   systems	   that	   combine	   committee	   selection,	   executive	   appointment,	  and	  retention	  via	  election.	  His	  answer	  focuses,	  in	  part,	  on	  the	  aims	  of	  variously	  in-­‐volved	  interests.	  To	  that	  end,	  he	  shows	  how	  “political	  and	  economic	  interests	  drove	  each	  stage	  of	  judicial	  selection.”24	  However,	  and	  perhaps	  more	  importantly	  in	  terms	  of	  theoretical	  contribution	  to	  the	  field	  of	  political	  development,	  Shugerman	  hones	  in	  on	   how	   specific	   ideas—here	   the	   idea	   of	   judicial	   independence—influence	   institu-­‐tional	  reform.	  Far	  from	  a	  story	  about	  interests	  and	  strategic	  actors,	  Shugerman	  ex-­‐plores	  how	   ideas	  matter	   in	   the	  push	   for	   institutional	   change.	  Thus,	   his	  book	   is	   as	  much	  an	  analytical	  narrative	  of	  changing	  state	  judicial	  institutional	  design	  as	  it	  is	  “a	  history	  of	  an	  idea.”25	  According	  to	  Shugerman,	  ideas	  have	  material	  force	  and	  conse-­‐quences.	   Interests	   are	   always	   operating	   in	   a	   context	   of	   ideational	   constraint.26	  As	  such,	  successful	  reform	  requires	  a	  skilled	  entrepreneurial	  actor	  who	  can	  effectively	  reshape	  an	  idea,	  even	  a	  previously	  rejected	  one,	  into	  the	  very	  solution	  to	  the	  identi-­‐fied	  problem,	  Such	  maneuvering	  often	  exploits	  a	  crisis	  or	  situation	  in	  which	  the	  in-­‐
                                                	   20.	  	   	  See	  generally	  CROWE,	  supra	  note	  8;	  SHUGERMAN,	  supra	  note	  9.	    	   21.	  	   CROWE,	  supra	  note	  8,	  at	  10.	  	   22.	  	   See	  KEN	   I.	  KERSCH,	  CONSTRUCTING	  CIVIL	  LIBERTIES:	  DISCONTINUITIES	   IN	  THE	  DEVELOPMENT	  OF	  AMERICAN	  CONSTITUTIONAL	  LAW	  (2004).	  On	  the	  myriad	  ways	  rulings	  may	  have	  socio-­‐political	  and	  historical	  impact,	  see	  WHAT	  BROWN	  V.	  BOARD	  OF	  EDUCATION	  SHOULD	  HAVE	  SAID	  3-­‐28	  (Jack	  Balkin	  ed.,	  2001).	  For	  an	  assessment	  of	  the	  limitations	  of	  judicial	  rulings,	  see	  MATTHEW	  E.	  K.	  HALL,	  THE	  NATURE	  OF	  SUPREME	  COURT	  POWER	  (2011);	  ROSENBERG,	   supra	   note	  17.	  For	   strong	  critiques	  of	  Rosenberg’s	   thesis	   and	  methodological	   assumptions,	  see	  Thomas	  M.	  Keck,	  Beyond	  Backlash:	  Assessing	  the	  Impact	  of	  Judicial	  Decisions	  on	  LGBT	  Rights,	  43	  L.	  &	  SOC’Y	  REV.	  (2009);	  Michael	  McCann,	  Causal	  versus	  Constitutive	  Explanations	  (or,	  On	  the	  Difficulty	  of	  Being	  
so	  Positive…),	  21	  L.	  &	  SOC.	  INQUIRY	  457	  (1996).	  	   23.	  	   CROWE,	  supra	  note	  8,	  at	  10.	  	   24.	  	   SHUGERMAN,	  supra	  note	  9,	  at	  268.	  	  	   25.	  	   Id.	  at	  7.	  	   26.	  	   Id.	  at	  7-­‐8.	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stitution	  in	  question	  has	  suffered	  a	  loss	  of	  legitimacy.27	  Judicial	  independence	  func-­‐tioned	  as	  a	  critical	  limit	  and	  objective	  for	  institutional	  reform,	  and	  it	  did	  so	  even	  as	  the	  meaning	  of	   that	   autonomy	  was	   continuously	   revised,	  precisely	  because	  of	   the	  array	  of	  challenges	  it	  was	  meant	  to	  solve.28	  Both	   books	   are	   part	   of	   a	   burgeoning	   tradition	   in	   historical	   institutionalism	  and	  American	  political	  development	  that	  focuses	  less	  on	  explaining	  judicial	  behav-­‐iors	  and	  decision	  outcomes,	  and	  more	  on	  how	  and	  why	   the	   institutions	  and	   ideas	  that	   contribute	   to	   judicial	   power	   have	   changed	   through	   the	   concerted	   actions	   of	  elected	  politicians.	  Over	  the	  past	  twenty	  years,	  historical	  and	  institutional-­‐oriented	  scholars	  have	  pointed	  not	  only	  to	  how	  recently	  electorally	  deposed	  political	   inter-­‐ests	  might	  entrench	  their	  aims	  through	  judicial	  appointment	  and	  expansion	  of	  judi-­‐cial	  power,29	  or	  how	  politicians	  might	  openly	  push	   the	   judiciary	   to	   take	  on	   issues	  that	   proved	   too	   controversial	   and	   hazardous	   to	   the	   maintenance	   of	   party	   coali-­‐tions,30	  but	  also	  how	  politicians	  may	  intentionally	  design	  strong	  courts	  for	  various	  political	  and	  policy	  purposes.31	  Indeed,	  far	  from	  ambitious	  politicians	  attempting	  to	  weaken	   judicial	  power	   to	  accrue	  more	  power	   for	   themselves	   in	  a	  zero-­‐sum	  game,	  political	  scientists	  exposed	  clear	  incentives	  for	  politicians	  to	  strengthen	  the	  judici-­‐ary	  to	  serve	  their	  own	  ends.	  Crowe	  and	  Shugerman	  build	  on	  the	  central	  idea	  at	  the	  foundation	  of	  the	  regime	  thesis,	  namely	  that	  judicial	  power	  is	  politically	  construct-­‐ed	  or	   that	   judicial	   power	   is	   built	   not	   (or	   at	   least	   significantly	  not	   only)	   by	   judges	  (and	  not	  only	  or	  at	  all	  via	  doctrine),	  but	  instead	  intentionally	  by	  politicians	  seeking	  multiple	  and	  possibly	  overlapping	  goals.32	  Crowe	   asks	   how	   the	   federal	   judiciary,	   and	   particularly	   the	   Supreme	   Court,	  could	  start	  as	  a	  body	  so	  weak	  that	  George	  Washington	  encountered	  great	  difficulty	  in	  convincing	  men	   to	  serve	  on	   it,	   and	  yet	  has	  become	  an	   institution	   that	  allegedly	  
                                                	   27.	  	   For	  more	  on	   the	  role	   ideas	  play	   in	   institutional	  reform,	  see	  THEDA	  SKOCPOL,	  PROTECTING	  SOLDIERS	  AND	  MOTHERS:	  THE	  POLITICAL	  ORIGINS	  OF	  SOCIAL	  POLICY	  IN	  THE	  UNITED	  STATES	  (1992);	  Robert	  Lieberman,	  Ide-­‐
as,	  Institutions,	  and	  Political	  Order:	  Explaining	  Political	  Change,	  96	  AM.	  POL.	  SCI.	  REV.	  697	  (2002).	  For	  ideas	  as	  a	  constraint	  on	  strategic	  action,	  see	  Stephen	  M.	  Engel,	  Organizational	  Identity	  as	  a	  Constraint	  on	  Stra-­‐
tegic	  Action:	  A	  Comparative	  Analysis	  of	  Gay	  and	  Lesbian	  Interest	  Groups,	  21	  STUD	  AM.	  POL.	  DEV.	  66	  (2007).	  On	  how	   crisis	   can	   be	   exploited	   by	   entrepreneurial	   politicians	   as	   an	   opportunity	   to	   reshape	   ideational	  constraints	  and	  push	   for	  reform,	  see	  William	  Sewell,	  A	  Theory	  of	  Structure:	  Duality,	  Agency,	  and	  Trans-­‐
formation,	  98	  AM.	  J.	  SOC.	  (1992).	  On	  how	  crisis	  can	  be	  used	  to	  reshape	  elected	  branch	  relations	  with	  the	  judiciary	  in	  particular,	  see	  ENGEL,	  supra	  note	  2.	  	   28.	  	   ENGEL,	  supra	  note	  2.	  	   29.	  	   See	   generally	   Howard	   Gillman,	   Party	   Politics	   and	   Constitutional	   Change:	   The	   Political	   Origins	   of	  
Liberal	  Judicial	  Activism,	  in	  THE	  SUPREME	  COURT	  AND	  AMERICAN	  POLITICAL	  DEVELOPMENT	  138,	  138-­‐68	  (Ronald	  Kahn	  &	  Ken	  I.	  Kersch	  eds.,	  2006);	  Howard	  Gillman,	  How	  Political	  Parties	  Can	  Use	  the	  Courts	  to	  Advance	  
Their	   Agendas:	   Federal	   Courts	   in	   the	   United	   States,	   1875-­‐1891,	   96	   AM.	   POL.	   SCI.	   REV.	   511	   (2002);	   RAN	  HIRSCHL,	  TOWARD	  JURISTOCRACY:	  THE	  ORIGINS	  AND	  CONSEQUENCES	  OF	  THE	  NEW	  CONSTITUTIONALISM	  43-­‐44,	  203-­‐06	  (2004).	  	   30.	  	   See	   generally	   GEORGE	   LOVELL,	   LEGISLATIVE	   DEFERRALS:	   STATUTORY	   AMBIGUITY,	   JUDICIAL	   POWER,	   AND	  AMERICAN	  DEMOCRACY	  (2003);	  Mark	  A.	  Graber,	  Federalist	  or	  Friend	  of	  Adams:	  The	  Marshall	  Court	  and	  Party	  
Politics,	   12	   STUD.	   AM.	   POL.	  DEV.	   229	   (1998);	  Mark	  A.	   Graber,	  The	  Nonmajoritarian	  Difficulty:	   Legislative	  
Deference	  to	  the	  Judiciary,	  7	  STUD.	  AM.	  POL.	  DEV.	  35	  (1993).	  	   31.	  	   See	  generally	  NEAL	  DEVINS	  &	  LOUIS	  FISHER,	  THE	  DEMOCRATIC	  CONSTITUTION	  (2004);	  J.	  Mitchell	  Pickerill	  &	  Cornell	  W,	  Clayton,	  The	  Rehnquist	  Court	  and	  the	  Political	  Dynamics	  of	  Federalism,	  2	  PERSPS.	  ON	  POL.	  233	  (2004);	  Keith	  E.	  Whittington,	  “Interpose	  Your	  Friendly	  Hand”:	  Political	  Supports	  for	  the	  Exercise	  of	  Judicial	  
Review	  by	  the	  United	  States	  Supreme	  Court,	  96	  AM.	  POL.	  SCI.	  REV.	  583	  (2005).	  	   32.	  	   See	  generally	  CROWE,	  supra	  note	  8;	  SHUGERMAN,	  supra	  note	  9.	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reigns	   supreme	   and	   seemingly	   definitively	   decides	   the	  major	   policy	   and	   political	  issues	   of	   our	   day.	   The	   traditional	   answer	   is	   that	   the	   Justices	  made	   it	   so	   through	  skillful	  use	  of	  their	  positions	  to	  announce	  first,	  the	  fundamental	  principle	  of	  judicial	  review	   in	  Marbury	   v.	  Madison,	   and	   later,	   the	   controversial	   position	   of	   judicial	   su-­‐premacy	   in	  Cooper	   v.	   Aaron.33	  However,	   by	   traversing	   over	   two	  hundred	   years	   of	  congressional	   legislation	   that	   designed,	   reorganized,	   refined,	   reconstructed,	   and	  expanded	  the	  institutional	  structure	  of	  the	  federal	   judiciary,	  Crowe	  illustrates	  that	  judicial	  power	  is	  politically	  constructed,	  that	  is,	  “political	  actors,	  rather	  than	  judges,	  were	  the	  ones	  who	  built	  the	  judiciary.”34	  Indeed,	  this	  finding	  holds	  true	  until	  the	  en-­‐trepreneurial	  actions	  taken	  by	  Chief	  Justice	  William	  Howard	  Taft	  and	  his	  steward-­‐ship	  of	  what	  would	  become	  the	  Judiciary	  Act	  of	  192535,	  a	  law	  which	  would	  establish	  a	  significant	  degree	  of	  judges’	  autonomy	  over	  the	  design,	  budget,	  and	  review	  capaci-­‐ty	  of	   their	  own	  branch.	  That	   law	  (together	  with	   some	  bureaucratic	   changes	  made	  during	  the	  1930s)	  marks	  a	  clear	  developmental	  demarcation.	  Whereas	  prior	  to	   its	  passage,	   the	  Court’s	   institutional	   structure	  was	   a	   prerogative	   of	   Congress	   per	   the	  terms	  of	  Article	   III	  of	   the	  Constitution,36	   “at	   the	  close	  of	   the	  1930s,	  one	   thing	  was	  abundantly	  clear:	  with	  the	  prerogative	  and	  responsibilities	  of	  the	  institutional	  judi-­‐ciary	   centralized	   in	   the	  hands	  of	   judges	   and	   coordinated	  by	   their	   judicial	   bureau-­‐crats,	   the	   largely	   dependent	   (even	   if	   increasingly	   powerful)	   judiciary	   of	   pre-­‐New	  Deal	  America	  was	  but	  a	  distant	  memory.”37	   In	   short,	   if	   judges	  did	  actively	  partici-­‐pate	  in	  building	  the	  capacities	  of	  their	  branch—and	  Crowe	  certainly	  demonstrates	  they	  did	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century—it	  was	  not	  by	  means	  of	  announc-­‐ing	  their	  powers	  via	  the	  rulings	  that	  make	  up	  the	  canon	  of	  American	  constitutional	  law.	   To	   illustrate	   the	  political	  process	  of	  constructing	   federal	   judicial	   institutions,	  Crowe	  has	  composed	  a	  book	  of	  remarkable	  architectural	  elegance.	  Guided	  by	  three	  questions—why	  was	   judicial	   institutional	   building	   pursued,	   how	  was	   this	   institu-­‐tional	  building	  accomplished,	  and	  what	  did	   this	   institutional	  building	  achieve—he	  offers	  a	  comprehensive	  account	  of	  how	  Congress	  established,	  reorganized,	  empow-­‐ered,	  and	  redesigned	  a	  federal	  judiciary	  whose	  shape	  and	  scope	  were	  left	  woefully	  unspecified	   by	   the	   constitutional	   framers.38	   Perhaps	   this	   insight	   into	   institutional	  development	  is	  less	  shocking	  to	  the	  degree	  that	  it	  follows	  the	  commands	  of	  Article	  III	   of	   the	   Constitution,	   but	   in	   light	   of	   the	   legal	   literature’s	   overreliance	   on	   judge-­‐made	   doctrine	   as	   a	   source	   of	   judicial	   power	   and	   capacity,	   this	   exhaustively	   re-­‐searched	  account	  proves	   a	  necessary	   tonic.39	   Crowe	   contends	   that	  while	   the	  Con-­‐gressional	  Record	  is	  littered	  with	  judiciary	  acts	  (some	  of	  which	  passed	  and	  many	  of	  which	  failed)	  such	  that	  judicial	  institution	  building	  “has	  been	  consistent	  throughout	  
                                                	   33.	  	   Cooper	  v.	  Aaron,	  358	  U.S.	  1	  (1958);	  Marbury	  v.	  Madison,	  5	  U.S.	  173	  (1803).	  	   34.	  	  	  CROWE,	  supra	  note	  8,	  at	  195.	  	   35.	  	   Judiciary	  Act	  of	  1925,	  Pub.	  L.	  No.	  68–415,	  43	  Stat.	  936	  (1925).	  	   36.	  	   U.S.	  CONST.	  art.	  III.	  	   37.	  	  	  CROWE,	  supra	  note	  8,	  at	  237.	  	   38.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  8-­‐16.	  	  	   39.	  	   U.S.	  CONST.	  art.	  III.	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American	  history,”40	  the	  developments	  he	  highlights	  have	  “largely	  been	  defined	  by	  a	  small	   set	   of	   transformative—and,	   for	   the	   most	   part,	   highly	   contested—reforms”	  which	  have	  been	  motivated	  by	  distinct	  political,	  policy,	  and	  performance	  goals.41	  Through	  a	  set	  of	  case	  studies	  that	  begin	  with	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  federal	  judiciary	   by	   the	   Judiciary	   Act	   of	   178942	   and	   span	   the	   additions,	   reconfigurations,	  and	  specializations	  made	  over	  two	  centuries,	  Crowe	  provides	  a	  rich	  analytic	  narra-­‐tive.	  He	  provides	  the	  historic	  detail	   that	  elucidates	   the	  rationale,	  problematic	  con-­‐sequences,	   and	  ultimate	   incapacity	   of	   a	   judicial	   system	  wedded	   to	   geographic	   ex-­‐pansion	   and	   norms	   of	   representation.	   He	   also	   compellingly	   illustrates	   how	  controversial	   rulings,	   far	   from	   securing	   judicial	   power,	   provided	   the	   fodder	   for	  members	  of	  Congress	   to	  keep	   the	   judiciary	   in	  a	  weakened,	  or	  at	   least	   far	   from	  an	  optimally	   efficient	   state.	   Contrary	   to	   the	   common	   story	   of	   Chief	   Justice	   Marshall	  building	  a	  nationalist	  Court,	  Crowe	  argues	  that	  the	  nationalist	  implications	  of	  Mar-­‐shall’s	  rulings	  from	  McCulloch	  v.	  Maryland	  and	  Gibbons	  v.	  Ogden	   to	  Dartmouth	  Col-­‐
lege	  v.	  Woodward	  and	  Martin	  v.	  Hunter’s	  Lessee	  incentivized	  Congress	  to	  avoid	  meet-­‐ing	   the	  needs	  of	  an	   ill-­‐equipped	   judiciary.43	  Empowering	  an	   institution	  with	   ideas	  counter	   to	   many	   in	   the	   Jacksonian	   congressional	   leadership	   would	   be	   politically	  counterproductive	   despite	   how	   the	   federal	   judiciary,	   seemingly	   as	   every	   political	  figure	  of	  the	  time	  acknowledged,	  could	  not	  service	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  expanding	  coun-­‐try:	   “[T]hese	  expressions	  of	   judicial	  nationalism	  were	  significant	  not	  because	   they	  represented	  unilateral	  judicial	  action	  in	  the	  service	  of	  institution	  building—they	  did	  not—but	  because	  they	  altered	  the	  strategic	  environment	  within	  which	  such	  institu-­‐tion	  building	  was	  already	  occurring.”44	  Nevertheless,	   in	   his	   understandable	   zeal	   to	   highlight	   how	  much	   more	   than	  doctrine	  matters	  when	  explaining	  the	  construction	  of	  judicial	  capacity,	  Crowe	  may	  overstate	  the	  point.	  For	  example,	  he	  follows	  the	  recent	  trend	  to	  diminish	  the	  stand-­‐ing	  of	   the	  Marbury	   ruling.45	   John	  Marshall	  barely	  authored	  any	  new	  conception	  of	  judicial	   review	   in	  Marbury,	   the	   fundamental	   idea	   having	   been	   voiced	   by	   Justices	  throughout	   the	   1790s	   and	   by	   Hamilton	   in	   The	   Federalist	   No.	   78.46	   Nevertheless,	  Crowe	  overreaches	  when	  he	  suggests,	  “[a]s	  purported	  episodes	  of	  institution	  build-­‐ing	   .	  .	  .	   the	  Marshall	   Court’s	   decisions	   in	  Marbury	   and	   Stuart	   are	   hardly	   notewor-­‐thy.”47	  Perhaps	  the	  rulings	  were	  strategic	  efforts	  merely	  to	  salvage	  judicial	  authori-­‐
                                                	   40.	  	   CROWE,	  supra	  note	  8,	  at	  14.	  	   41.	  	  	  Id.	  at	  15.	  	  	   42.	  	   Judiciary	  Act	  of	  1789,	  ch.	  20,	  §	  25,	  1	  Stat.	  73	  (codified	  as	  amended	  at	  28	  U.S.C.	  §	  1350).	  	   43.	  	   Gibbons	  v.	  Ogden,	  22	  U.S.	  1	  (1824);	  Dartmouth	  C.	  v.	  Woodward,	  17	  U.S.	  518	  (1819);	  McCulloch	  v.	  Maryland,	  17	  U.S.	  316	  (1819);	  Martin	  v.	  Hunter’s	  Lessee,	  14	  U.S.	  304	  (1816).	  	   44.	  	  	  CROWE,	  supra	  note	  8,	  at	  94.	  	   45.	  	   See	  BRUCE	  ACKERMAN,	  THE	  FAILURE	  OF	  THE	  FOUNDING	  FATHERS:	   JEFFERSON,	  MARSHALL,	  AND	  THE	  RISE	  OF	  PRESIDENTIAL	   DEMOCRACY	   191-­‐94	   (2005);	   LARRY	   KRAMER,	   THE	   PEOPLE	   THEMSELVES:	   POPULAR	  CONSTITUTIONALISM	   AND	   JUDICIAL	   REVIEW	   113-­‐27	   (2005);	   see	   generally	   WILLIAM	   E.	   NELSON,	   MARBURY	   V.	  
MADISON:	  THE	  ORIGINS	  AND	  LEGACY	  OF	  JUDICIAL	  REVIEW	  (2000).	  See	  also	  Johnathan	  O’Neill,	  Marbury	  v.	  Madi-­‐son	  at	  200:	  Revisionist	  Scholarship	  and	   the	  Legitimacy	  of	  American	   Judicial	  Review,	  65	  MOD.	  L.	  REV.	  792	  (2002)	  (reviewing	  Marbury	  revisionism	  literature).	  	   46.	  	   THE	  FEDERALIST	  NO.	  78	  (Alexander	  Hamilton).	  	   47.	  	   CROWE,	  supra	  note	  8,	  at	  77	  (citing	  Marbury	  v.	  Madison,	  5	  U.S.	  173	  (1803);	  Stuart	  v.	  Laird,	  5	  U.S.	  299	  (1803)).	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ty	  in	  the	  face	  of	  Jeffersonian	  attacks,	  but	  the	  assessment	  that	  the	  rulings	  did	  nothing	  to	  shape	  the	  nature	  and	  scope	  of	  judicial	  power	  is	  only	  possible	  when	  the	  cases	  are	  torn	  from	  their	  context.	  Indeed,	  the	  rulings—seeming	  retreats	  and	  conciliations	  to-­‐ward	  new	  Jeffersonian	  majorities	  in	  the	  elected	  branches—did	  not	  stifle	  the	  attacks.	  Also,	  Crowe	  oddly	   ignores	  what	  came	   in	   their	  wake,	  namely	   the	   impeachments	  of	  federal	  judges,	  most	  notably	  Justice	  Samuel	  Chase.	  Far	  from	  leaving	  the	  institutional	  capacity	  of	  the	  Court	  undisturbed,	  the	  impeachments	  shifted	  the	  meanings	  of	  judi-­‐cial	  independence	  and	  the	  boundaries	  of	  the	  proper	  authority	  of	  the	  judge.48	  While	  the	   rulings	   and	   the	   impeachment	   battles	   they	   provoked	   did	   not,	   Crowe	   rightly	  notes,	  build	  capacity	  in	  and	  of	  themselves,	  they	  did	  shape	  the	  contours	  of	  future	  ar-­‐guments	  about	  what	  the	  proper	  scope	  of	  judicial	  authority	  should	  be.49	  Considering	  development	  mostly	  in	  terms	  of	  institution-­‐building	  and	  leaving	  under-­‐explored	  the	  role	  of	  ideas	  in	  that	  construction	  process	  renders	  Crowe’s	  account	  lopsided.	  	   	   	   Crowe’s	  discussion	  of	   ingredients	  necessary	  for	  successful	   institution	  build-­‐ing	  is	  a	  particularly	  useful	  synthesis	  of	  much	  of	  the	  American	  political	  development	  literature.	   He	   focuses	   on	   two	  mechanisms	   that	   are	   often	   highlighted	   in	   that	   field:	  significant	  events	  (what	  other	  scholars	  might	  focus	  on	  as	  critical	  junctures)	  and	  the	  actions	  of	  particularly	  skilled	  political	  entrepreneurs.50	  The	  discussion	  of	  significant	  events	   enables	   Crowe	   to	   integrate	   judicial	   institutional	   development	   within	   the	  broader	  contours	  of	  political	  development,	  or	  as	  he	  writes,	  his	  approach	  “to	  creating	  a	  developmental	  account	  of	  judicial	  power,	  then,	  embeds	  case	  studies	  of	  a	  series	  of	  transformative	  movements	  within	   a	  more	   deeply	   contextual	   understanding	   of	   the	  process	   in	   the	   historical	   period	   under	   consideration.”51	   This	   intention	   is	   laudable	  and	   other	   American	   Political	   Development	   and	   historical	   scholars	   have	   called	   for	  this	   kind	   of	   contextual	   integration	   of	   judicial	   institutional	   change.	   For	   example,	  Ronald	  Kahn	  and	  Ken	  Kersch	  have	  called	  for	  inquiry	  into:	  	  [T]he	  relationship	  between	   law	  and	  politics	  by	  refusing	   to	   isolate	  questions	   involving	   legal	  doctrines	   and	   judicial	   decisions	   and	   the	  special	  qualities	  of	   courts	  as	  decision-­‐making	  units	   from	   the	  con-­‐sideration	  of	  developments	  elsewhere	   in	   the	  political	   system—be	  they	   in	   ideologies,	   elite	   and	   popular	   political	   thought,	   social	  movements,	  or	   in	   formal	   institutions,	  such	  as	  Congress,	   the	  presi-­‐dency,	  state	  and	  federal	  bureaucracies,	  and	  state	  and	  federal	  court	  decisions.52	  	  	   	  
                                                	   48.	  	   KEITH	  WHITTINGTON,	   CONSTITUTIONAL	   CONSTRUCTION:	   DIVIDED	   POWERS	   AND	   CONSTITUTIONAL	  MEANING	  50-­‐61	  (2001).	  	   49.	  	   CROWE,	  supra	  note	  8,	  at	  77-­‐79.	  	   50.	  	   See	   PAUL	   PIERSON,	   POLITICS	   IN	   TIME:	   HISTORY,	   INSTITUTIONS,	   AND	   SOCIAL	   ANALYSIS	   (2004);	   see	   also	  DANIEL	   CARPENTER,	   THE	   FORGING	   OF	   BUREAUCRATIC	   AUTONOMY:	   REPUTATIONS,	   NETWORKS,	   AND	   POLICY	  INNOVATIONS	  IN	  EXECUTIVE	  AGENCIES,	  1862-­‐1928	  (2001);	  see	  generally	  FORMATIVE	  ACTS:	  AMERICAN	  POLITICS	  IN	  THE	  MAKING	  (Stephen	  Skowronek	  &	  Matthew	  Glassman	  eds.,	  2008);	  Adam	  Sheingate,	  Political	  Entrepre-­‐
neurship,	  Institutional	  Change,	  and	  American	  Political	  Development,	  17	  STUD.	  AM.	  POL.	  DEV.	  185	  (2003).	  	   51.	  	   CROWE,	  supra	  note	  8,	  at	  15.	  	   52.	  	   THE	  SUPREME	  COURT,	  supra	  note	  29,	  at	  13.	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   Nevertheless,	  Crowe’s	  contextualization	  of	  the	  politics	  of	  debate,	  and	  passage	  or	  failure	  of	  the	  judiciary	  acts	  remains	  wedded	  mostly	  to	  the	  broad	  brushstrokes	  of	  the	  same	  regimes	  (Jeffersonian,	   Jacksonian,	  Civil	  War/Reconstruction,	  Progressive,	  and	  Modern)	   that	   characterize	   previous	   work	   on	   judicial-­‐presidential	   interaction,	  presidential	   power,	   and	   party	   change	   over	   time,	   which	   have	   previously	   been	   as-­‐sessed	   as	   potentially	   stifling.53	   As	   such,	   Crowe	   does	   not	   grapple	   sufficiently	   with	  how	   the	   interaction	   of	   separate	   institutional	   and	   ideational	   orders	   of	   governance	  and	  politics	  affect	  judicial	  construction;	  in	  other	  words,	  how	  might	  ideas	  about	  judi-­‐cial	  independence	  or	  a	  political	  party	  change	  over	  time,	  thereby	  affecting	  why	  judi-­‐cial	  reorganization	  is	  foreclosed	  or	  enabled,	  or	  how	  have	  institutional	  powers	  of	  the	  other	  branches	  shifted,	  thereby	  opening	  or	  closing	  space	  for	  the	  judiciary?	  Through	  a	  systematic	  focus	  on	  political	  identities,	  ideas,	  and	  tactics,	  he	  carefully	  explains	  why	  particular	   entrepreneurial	   actors	   (e.g.,	   Ellsworth,	  Evarts,	  Taft,	   Cummings)	   are	   suc-­‐cessful	   in	  securing	  the	  institutional	  reforms	  they	  seek	  while	  others	  (e.g.,	  Randolph,	  Webster,	   and	  possibly	  Van	  Buren)	  are	  not.	  Nevertheless,	   he	  ultimately	  produces	  a	  narrative	  that	  suggests	  judicial	  power	  exists	  because	  Congress	  intended	  it	  to	  be	  so.	  Members	  of	  Congress	  had	  multiple	  reasons	  to	  support	  judicial	  power—some	  were	  policy-­‐oriented,	  some	  were	  political,	  and	  others	  were	  sincerely	  to	  enhance	  the	  performance	  of	  the	  institution—all	  of	  which	  Crowe	  details	  astutely.	  However,	  while	  Crowe	  draws	  attention	  to	  the	  contingencies	  at	  play,	  the	  end	  result	  is	  perhaps	  a	  bit	  unsettlingly	  functionalist	  given	  his	  intention	  to	  offer	  a	  developmental	  theory.	  Such	  a	  theory,	   by	   definition,	   should	   aim	   to	   showcase	   the	   limits	   of	   functionalist	   explana-­‐tions.54	  Crowe’s	  answer	  to	  the	  question,	  “[h]ow	  did	  the	  federal	  judiciary	  in	  general,	  and	  the	  Supreme	  Court	   in	  particular,	   transcend	   its	  early	   limitations	  and	  become	  a	  powerful	   institution	   of	   American	   governance?,”	   appears	   to	   be	   that	   Congress	   pur-­‐posively	  sought	   to	  build	   it	  so.55	  This	  claim	  remains	  a	  critical	   insight	   in	   light	  of	   the	  contention	  that	  judicial	  power	  is	  created	  solely	  by	  judges	  via	  rulings	  and	  the	  accu-­‐mulation	  of	  doctrine.	  However,	  while	  Crowe	  contends	  that	  this	  idea	  dominates	  con-­‐ventional	   legal	   literature	   throughout	  his	   first	   and	   last	   chapters,	   even	  he	   acknowl-­‐edges	   that,	   for	   at	   least	   the	   last	   decade,	   American	   Political	   Development	   scholars	  have	   drawn	   attention	   to	   how	   the	   elected	   branches	   can	   construct	   and	  manipulate	  the	  Court	  to	  serve	  their	  own	  political	  aims.56	  As	  such,	  Crowe’s	  synthetic	  text	  serves	  more	  as	  an	  erudite	  and	  encyclopedic	  final	  word	  on	  the	  matter	  rather	  than	  a	  provoc-­‐ative	  invocation	  of	  a	  new	  research	  agenda.	  Jed	  Shugerman	  is	  also	  interested	  in	  explaining	  judicial	  institutional	  design.	  In	  contrast	  with	  the	  bulk	  of	  developmental	  research	  on	  judicial	  institutions,	  which	  ex-­‐amine	  the	  federal	  judiciary,	  Shugerman	  turns	  his	  attention	  to	  state	  judiciaries.	  The	  design	  of	  state	  courts	  has	  undergone	  multiple	  reforms	  over	  time,	  often	  in	  ways	  that	  
                                                	   53.	  	   See	  DAVID	  R.	  MAYHEW,	  ELECTORAL	  REALIGNMENTS:	  A	  CRITIQUE	  OF	  AN	  AMERICAN	  GENRE	  (2002);	  STEPHEN	  SKOWRONEK,	  THE	  POLITICS	  PRESIDENTS	  MAKE:	  FROM	  JOHN	  ADAMS	  TO	  BILL	  CLINTON	  (1997);	  JAMES	  L.	  SUNDQUIST,	  DYNAMICS	   OF	   THE	   PARTY	   SYSTEM:	   ALIGNMENT	   AND	   REALIGNMENT	   OF	   POLITICAL	   PARTIES	   IN	   THE	   UNITED	   STATES	  (1983);	  Whittington,	  supra	  note	  14.	  	   54.	  	   On	  the	  limits	  of	  actor-­‐centered	  functionalism,	  see	  PIERSON,	  supra	  note	  50,	  at	  105-­‐32.	  	   55.	  	   See	  CROWE,	  supra	  note	  8,	  at	  2.	  	   56.	  	   Id.	  at	  21-­‐22.	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seem	  counterintuitive	  if	  the	  motivating	  idea	  of	  judicial	  independence	  is	  considered	  central.	   Shugerman’s	   explanation	   of	   this	   paradox	   explicitly	   connects	   institutional	  design	   with	   ideational	   development	   and	   change	   over	   time.57	   As	   such,	   he	   is	   not	  hemmed	  in	  by	  the	  limits	  of	  historical	  institutionalism,	  which	  has	  little	  room	  for	  the	  allegedly	  “softer”	  concepts	  of	  culture	  and	  ideas.	  Rather,	  he	  bridges	  this	  gap,	  which	  has	  often	  divided	  the	  field	  of	  American	  political	  development	  as	  either	  scholarship	  on	   institutions	  or	   scholarship	  on	   ideas	  and	  culture,	  but	   rarely	  both	   simultaneous-­‐ly.58	  Shugerman’s	  account	  of	  how	  and	  why	  state	  courts	  were	  repeatedly	  redesigned	  over	  two	  hundred	  years	  is	  as	  much	  a	  tale	  of	  economic	  and	  political	  interest	  as	  it	  is	  a	  history	  of	  the	  dynamic	  idea	  of	  judicial	  independence	  itself.	  Whereas	   many	   countries	   have	   looked	   to	   the	   United	   States	   for	   examples	   of	  functional	  legal	  institutions,	  Shugerman	  notes,	  “almost	  no	  one	  else	  in	  the	  world	  has	  ever	  experimented	  with	  the	  popular	  election	  of	  judges.”59	  As	  such,	  a	  question	  natu-­‐rally	  arises:	  “Why	  have	  Americans	  adopted	  such	  a	  strange	  practice,	  when	  almost	  no	  one	  else	  has	  done	  so	  before	  or	  after?”60	  Even	  more	  challenging,	  if	  the	  fundamental	  premise	  of	  judicial	  autonomy	  and	  neutrality	  rests	  upon	  the	  idea	  of	  severing	  judges	  from	  popular	  pressures,	  then	  the	  mechanism	  of	  election	  appears	  to	  do	  nothing	  ex-­‐cept	  undermine	   the	  principle	   central	   to	  American	   constitutionalism	  of	   judicial	   in-­‐dependence.	   In	   a	  major	   advance	   in	   the	   understanding	   of	   the	   judiciary,	   in	   the	   ac-­‐counting	  of	   institutional	  development,	  and	  in	  developmental	  theory	  more	  broadly,	  Shugerman	  resolves	  this	  paradox	  through	  both	  a	  clear	  argument	  and	  detailed	  evi-­‐dence	  of	  how	  ideas	  shape	  and	  constrain	  the	  range	  of	  reforms	  entrepreneurial	  actors	  may	  advance.	  In	  a	  relentlessly	  engaging	  work	  of	  immense	  scope	  and	  with	  significant	  atten-­‐tion	   to	   historical	   detail,	   Shugerman	   illustrates	   how	   the	   idea	   of	   judicial	   independ-­‐ence	  took	  on	  different	  meanings	  over	  time	  and	  was	  constructed	  by	  entrepreneurial	  politicians	  as	   a	   solution	   to	  a	   range	  of	  distinct	  problems.61	   In	  other	  words,	   judicial	  independence	  was	   always	   the	   overriding	   goal	  motivating	   judicial	   institutional	   re-­‐form	  at	  the	  state	  level,	  but	  the	  key	  question	  was	  always	  “independence	  from	  what?”	  That	  “what”	  changed	  significantly	  as	  politicians	  continuously	  identified	  new	  sources	  of	   corruption	   that	   threatened	   judicial	   capacity	   to	   rule	   impartially.	   Colonial	   judges	  might	  be	  tied	  too	  closely	  to	  the	  king,	  so	  the	  solution	  was	  to	  give	  appointing	  authori-­‐ty	  to	  the	  people’s	  branch	  or	  legislature.	  The	  initial	  solution	  would	  later	  become	  the	  problem	   itself,	   as	   legislative	  appointment	  would	   later	   fall	   victim	   to	   accusations	  of	  cronyism.62	   Therefore,	   by	   the	   mid-­‐nineteenth	   century,	   new	   calls	   for	   reform	   cen-­‐tered	  on	  liberating	  the	  courts	  from	  legislators	  and	  the	  governors	  and	  more	  directly	  
                                                	   57.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  7-­‐12.	  	  	   58.	  	   Brian	  J.	  Glenn,	  The	  Two	  Schools	  of	  American	  Political	  Development,	  2	  POL.	  STUD.	  REV.	  153,	  153-­‐65	  (2004).	  For	  recent	  work	  that	  highlights	  the	  need	  for	  more	  explicit	  emphasis	  on	  the	  interaction	  of	  ideas,	  culture,	   and	   institutional	   development	   specifically,	   see	   RACE	   AND	   AMERICAN	   POLITICAL	   DEVELOPMENT	   (Jo-­‐seph	  Lowndes	  et	  al.,	  eds.,	  2008);	  PAUL	  FRYMER,	  BLACK	  AND	  BLUE:	  AFRICAN	  AMERICANS,	  THE	  LABOR	  MOVEMENT,	  AND	  THE	  DECLINE	  OF	  THE	  DEMOCRATIC	  PARTY	  (2007);	  see	  also	  ENGEL,	  supra	  note	  2.	  	   59.	  	   See	  SHUGERMAN,	  supra	  note	  9,	  at	  5.	  	   60.	  	   Id.	  	   61.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  7-­‐12.	  	   62.	  	   Id.	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connecting	  them	  to	  the	  people	  themselves	  via	  election.63	  In	   other	   words,	   far	   from	   undermining	   judicial	   independence,	   Shugerman	  shows	  how	  the	  mechanism	  of	  election	  was	  meant	  to	  enhance	  that	  independence.64	  This	  counterintuitive	  notion	  becomes	  clear	  when	   judicial	   independence	   is	  not	  un-­‐derstood—as	  it	  is	  too	  often	  framed	  in	  the	  counter-­‐majoritarian	  paradigm—as	  inde-­‐pendence	  from	  the	  other	  branches	  per	  se,	  but	  instead	  as	  independence	  from	  corrup-­‐tion,	  regardless	  of	  the	  source.	  Therefore,	   judicial	  elections	  make	  perfect	  sense	  as	  a	  reform	  to	  ensure	  judicial	  power,	  particularly	  when	  embedded	  into	  the	  history	  of	  the	  new	   institution	   animating	   mid-­‐nineteenth	   century	   American	   democracy,	   namely	  the	   rise	   of	   the	  mass-­‐based	   political	   party.	   Indeed,	   as	   other	   scholars	   have	   argued,	  “party”	  was	  construed	  as	  the	  solution	  to	  all	  sorts	  of	  thorny	  political	  issues,	  ranging	  from	   empowering	   the	   presidency65	   to	   securing	   the	   durability	   of	   the	   Constitution	  against	  forces	  that	  might	  undermine	  it.66	  Shugerman’s	  account	  integrates	  the	  chang-­‐ing	  nature	  of	  judicial	  design	  into	  these	  larger	  political	  dynamics.	  As	  such,	  his	  book	  is	  a	  much-­‐needed	  advance	  in	  a	  literature	  that	  too	  often	  isolates	  judicial	  development	  from	  broader	  forces.	  Perry	  and	  Powe	  once	  lamented,	  “[f]ocusing	  on	  political	  parties	  is	   not	   something	   legal	   academics	   tend	   to	   do	   .	   .	  .	  .	  When	   it	   comes	   to	   constitutional	  analysis,	   they	   fall	   off	   the	   radar	   screen.”67	   Shugerman’s	   book	   lays	   that	   critique	   to	  rest.	   As	  a	  matter	  of	  theoretical	  innovation,	  Shugerman	  explains	  how	  the	  meaning	  of	  a	   given	   concept	   depends	   on	   context;	   its	  meaning	   changes	   over	   time	   due	   to	   envi-­‐ronmental	   shifts	   that	   may	   or	   not	   be	   related	   to	   the	   idea	   itself.68	   According	   to	  Shugerman:	  	   “Judicial	   independence”	   and	   “judicial	   accountability”	   are	   not	   ab-­‐stract	   concepts	   with	   fixed	   meanings	   over	   time.	   They	   depend	   on	  context,	  and	  they	  have	  evolved	  in	  the	  flow	  of	  events	  and	  crises.	  In-­‐terest	   group	   politics,	   economics,	   and	   specific	   events	   drive	   these	  stories	  of	  judicial	  design	  at	  each	  stage,	  yet	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  ideas	  mattered	  .	  .	  .	  .	  At	  each	  stage,	  the	  goal	  of	  separating	  law	  from	  politics	  was	   a	   significant	   part	   of	   the	   campaign	   for	   each	  model	   of	   judicial	  
                                                	   63.	  	   Id.	  	   64.	  	   Id.	  	   65.	  	   Stephen	   Skowronek,	  The	   Conservative	   Insurgency	   and	   Presidential	   Power:	   A	   Developmental	   Per-­‐
spective	  on	  the	  Unitary	  Executive,	  122	  HARV.	  L.	  REV.	  2070	  (2008).	  	   66.	  	   GERALD	   LEONARD,	   THE	   INVENTION	   OF	   PARTY	   POLITICS:	   FEDERALISM,	   POPULAR	   SOVEREIGNTY,	   AND	  CONSTITUTIONAL	  DEVELOPMENT	  IN	  JACKSONIAN	  ILLINOIS	  (2002).	  	   67.	  	   H.W.	  Perry,	   Jr.	  &	  L.A.	  Powe,	   Jr.,	  The	  Political	  Battle	   for	   the	  Constitution,	  21	  CONST.	  COMMENT.	  641,	  643	  (2004).	  	   68.	  	   A	  similar	  notion	  is	  examined	  as	  “situated	  rationality,”	  in	  which	  what	  is	  considered	  rational	  action	  is	  not	  a	  static	  abstraction,	  but	  contextualized	  by	  particular	  institutional	  and	  ideational	  settings.	  See	  Elisa-­‐beth	  Clemens	  &	  James	  Cook,	  Politics	  and	  Institutionalism:	  Explaining	  Durability	  and	  Change,	  	  45	  ANN.	  REV.	  OF	  SOC.	  441	  (1999);	  Ira	  Katznelson,	  Situated	  Rationality:	  A	  Preface	  to	  J.	  David	  Greenstone’s	  Reading	  of	  V.O.	  
Key’s	  The	  Responsible	  Electorate,	  in	  THE	  LIBERAL	  TRADITION	  IN	  AMERICAN	  POLITICS:	  REASSESSING	  THE	  LEGACY	  OF	  AMERICAN	  LIBERALISM	  199	  (David	  Ericson	  &	  Louisa	  Bertch	  Green	  eds.,	  1999).	  On	  ideas	  as	  constitutive	  of	  social	  reality,	  see	  MEANING	  AND	  CONTEXT:	  QUENTIN	  SKINNER	  AND	  HIS	  CRITICS	  (James	  Tully	  ed.,1988).	  On	  con-­‐textualized	  or	  situated	  rationality	  as	  “thick	  rationality,”	  see	  Victor	  Nee,	  Sources	  of	  the	  New	  Institutional-­‐
ism,	  in	  THE	  NEW	  INSTITUTIONALISM	  IN	  SOCIOLOGY	  9,	  10-­‐11	  (Mary	  C.	  Brinton	  &	  Victor	  Nee	  eds.,	  1988).	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elections.	  But	   the	  notion	  of	  what	   “politics”	   judges	  were	   supposed	  to	  be	  independent	  from	  changed	  over	  time,	  in	  part	  because	  the	  no-­‐tions	   of	   what	   kinds	   of	   politics	  were	   necessary	   versus	   corrupting	  also	  changed	  over	  time.69	  	  In	  other	  words,	  Shugerman	  demonstrates	  how	  ideas	  matter	  neither	  solely	  nor	  pri-­‐marily	   as	   rhetorical	   devices,	   but	   as	   real	   constraints	   on	   the	   entrepreneurial	   action	  politicians	  may	  take	  in	  attempting	  institutional	  reform.	  Consider,	   for	   example,	   the	   move	   during	   the	   mid-­‐twentieth	   century	   to	   shift	  control	   over	   the	   judiciary	   from	   the	   people	   themselves,	   via	   popular	   and	   partisan	  election,	   to	   specialized	   advisory	   committees	   and	   retention	   election.	   Shugerman	  draws	  attention	  to	  this	  “puzzling	  rise	  of	  merit”	  by	  pointedly	  asking,	  “[h]ow	  did	  elite	  judicial	  appointment	  by	  lawyers	  replace	  direct	  elections	  mainly	  in	  the	  regions	  that	  were	  most	  alienated	  by	  the	  appointed	  Warren	  Court,	  and	  during	  a	  broader	  cultural	  turn	  against	  intellectuals	  and	  professional	  expertise?”70	  In	  other	  words,	  why	  would	  people	  at	  the	  state	  level	  give	  up	  direct	  control	  over	  an	  institution	  and	  seemingly	  de-­‐sign	   it	   to	  be	  more	  removed	  when	  rhetorical	  hostilities	  against	   judicial	  activism	  by	  unelected	  federal	  judges,	  particularly	  the	  Supreme	  Court,	  ran	  so	  high?	  Before	  offer-­‐ing	  his	  own	  answer	   to	   this	  question,	  Shugerman	   incisively	  points	  out	   the	   flaws	   in	  existing	   alternative	   hypotheses,	   which	   range	   from	   the	   politics	   of	   partisan	   ad-­‐vantage,	  to	  Progressive-­‐inspired	  good	  governance	  reforms,	  to	  the	  power	  of	  interest,	  particularly	   the	   American	   Bar	   Association	   and	   the	   American	   Judicature	   Society.71	  But,	  for	  Shugerman,	  the	  answer	  relies	  on	  the	  state’s	  level	  of	  economic	  development,	  which	  configured	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  between	  labor	  and	  industrial	  capital:	  “Merit	  succeeded	  in	  states	  where	  business	  had	  grown	  powerful	  enough	  to	  support	  a	  cam-­‐paign	   for	   merit	   selection,	   but	   also	   where	   labor	   and	   urban	  machines	   had	   not	   yet	  reached	  enough	  power	  to	  block	  those	  campaigns.”72	  But	  context	  is	  not	  cause,	  and	  so	  Shugerman	  attends	  to	  how	  supporters	  of	  mer-­‐it	  selection	  exemplified	  entrepreneurship,	  or	  what	  Shugerman	  calls	  “opportunistic	  leadership,”73	   to	   frame	  the	   judicial	  reform	  as	  a	  necessary	  step	  toward	  solving	  par-­‐ticular	  problems,	  such	  as	  facing	  a	  crime	  wave	  in	  California,	  blocking	  an	  increasingly	  powerful	   African-­‐American	   voice	   in	   pre-­‐Civil	   Rights	   Alabama,	   or	   curbing	   union	  power	  in	  Kansas.	  As	  such,	  Shugerman,	  like	  Crowe,	  debunks	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  most	  prominent	   motivator	   for	   judicial	   reform	   is	   securing	   partisan	   advantage	   and	   en-­‐trenchment.74	  Crowe	  points	  to	  judicial	  reform	  motivated	  more	  by	  concerns	  with	  in-­‐stitutional	   efficiency	   and	   other	   performance	   aims	   than	   pure	   politicking,	   while	  Shugerman	  highlights	  a	  range	  of	  motivators	  at	  the	  state	  level.75	  While	  the	  particular	  policy	  motivations	  differed	  from	  state	  to	  state,	  merit	  selection	  itself	  was	  a	  success-­‐
                                                	   69.	  	   SHUGERMAN,	  supra	  note	  9,	  at	  5-­‐6.	  	  	   70.	  	   Id.	  at	  208.	  	  	   71.	  	   Id.	  208-­‐10.	  	   72.	  	   Id.	  at	  210.	  	   73.	  	   Id.	  at	  238.	  	   74.	  	   Id.	  at	  238-­‐40.	  	  	   75.	  	   Compare	  CROWE,	  supra	  note	  8,	  with	  SHUGERMAN,	  supra	  note	  9.	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ful	  solution	  only	  in	  a	  particular	  economic	  context,	  namely	  “rural-­‐but-­‐industrializing	  states.”76	  And,	  more	  broadly,	  the	  successful	  passage	  of	  judicial	  reform	  depended	  on	  always	   linking	   the	   reform	   itself	   to	   the	   enhancement	   of	   judicial	   independence.	  Shugerman	  offers	   comprehensive	  and	   rigorous	  validation	  of	   the	  need	   for	  political	  and	  legal	  developmental	  scholarship	  to	  attend	  to	  structure	  and	  agency,	  institutions	  and	  ideas,	  interests	  and	  identities.	  Ultimately,	   Crowe	   and	   Shugerman	   convincingly	   contend	   that	   too	   much	   re-­‐search	  to	  date	  has	  misguidedly	  set	  the	  courts	  as	  an	  institution	  apart.	  Doing	  so	  has	  only	   perpetuated	   the	   stifling	   paradigmatic	   dominance	   of	   counter-­‐majoritarianism	  and	   confused	   normative	   claims	   for	   judicial	   neutrality	   and	   independence	  with	   the	  empirical	  reality	  of	  judicial	  dependence	  and	  purposive	  political	  action.	  Each	  author	  demonstrates	  how	  judicial	  power	  has	  changed	  over	  time	  via	  the	  concerted	  efforts	  of	  politicians	   seeking	   to	   address	   readily	   understood	   challenges,	   ranging	   from	   over-­‐coming	  inefficiency	  to	  eradicating	  corruption	  to	  attaining	  political	  advantage.	  They	  deftly	  showcase	  the	  need	  to	  embed	  judicial	  development	  in	  the	  larger	  dynamics	  of	  political	   development,	   both	   institutional	   and	   ideational.	   And,	   as	  we	   confront	   new	  partisan	  dynamics	  affecting	  the	  judiciary	  at	  the	  federal	  level,	  such	  as	  the	  increasing	  use	   of	   the	   filibuster	   to	   stymie	   appointment	   and	   leave	   the	   courts	  woefully	   under-­‐staffed,	  and	  at	  the	  state	  level,	  such	  as	  increasing	  stores	  of	  cash	  being	  funneled	  to	  in-­‐creasingly	   vitriolic	   campaigns	   in	   judicial	   retention	   elections,	   attending	   to	   the	  broader	  political	  dynamics	  affecting	  judicial	  institutions	  is	  more	  important	  than	  ev-­‐er.	   To	   confront	   these	   new	   challenges,	   both	   Crowe	   and	   Shugerman’s	   accomplish-­‐ments	  stand	  as	  models	   for	  how	  and	  why	  researchers	  seeking	   to	  craft	  comprehen-­‐sive	   and	   engaging	   legal,	   historical,	   and	  political	   scholarship	  must	   do	   exactly	  what	  Bickel	  and	  Dahl	  did	  not	  do	  when	  they	  wrote	  their	  path-­‐breaking	  works:	  transcend	  disciplinary	   boundaries	   to	   show	   how	   judicial	   power	   and	   change	   is	   not	   merely	   a	  matter	  of	  doctrinal	  development	  but	  is	  deeply	  connected	  to	  broader	  political	  devel-­‐opments	  related	  to	  party,	  Congress,	  the	  presidency,	  partisanship,	  and	  changing	  no-­‐tions	  of	  judicial	  independence.	  
                                                	   76.	  	   SHUGERMAN,	  supra	  note	  9,	  at	  238.	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